A Moral Bureaucracy: Enforcement of EU Fundamental Values in Central and Eastern Europe by Sheets, Sarah L
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the
European Union
Volume 2019 Article 7
8-23-2019
A Moral Bureaucracy: Enforcement of EU
Fundamental Values in Central and Eastern Europe
Sarah L. Sheets
University of California, Berkeley
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized editor of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more
information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sheets, Sarah L. (2019) "A Moral Bureaucracy: Enforcement of EU Fundamental Values in Central and Eastern Europe," Claremont-
UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2019, Article 7. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201901.07
Available at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/7
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 7 7
7
A Moral Bureaucracy: Enforcement of EU 
Fundamental Values in Central and Eastern 
Europe
Sarah L. Sheets
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
 There is growing sentiment that the rise of illiberal democracy in Central and East-
ern Europe poses a serious threat to fundamental European values. Within the framework 
of the European Union (EU) legal system, how do post-socialist member states actually 
comply with fundamental European values? While there are multiple contradictory theories 
about the success or failure of assimilation in the region, there is surprisingly little data-
driven literature which directly compares post-socialist member state compliance to the rest 
of the European member states. This paper fills the gap by comparing post-socialist compli-
ance patterns with the rest of the EU, using data on infringement cases opened by the Com-
mission. It finds that post-socialist member states are generally assimilating into pre-existing 
patterns of European compliance. However, they are demonstrably worse in fundamental 
European values compliance—and though a legal basis for enforcing these values exists, the 
EU currently lacks the practical ability to do so.
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1. Introduction
“Courts have been crippled, public and private press has been muzzled, refugees 
have been refused solidarity, NGOs have been discredited and branded as foreign 
agents, universities have been silenced and Brussels has been demonized. The seem-
ingly endless stream of reports from Poland and Hungary leaves no room for illusion: 
our fundamental values are under attack. Nothing less than our common future is at 
stake.” –Viviane Reding, Luxembourg Member of European Parliament (MEP)
 When historian Timothy Garton Ash spoke with Czechoslovak president-to-be 
Vaclav Havel, he famously quipped that “in Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten 
months, in East Germany ten weeks: perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!” 
(Garton, 1990) He wasn’t far off the mark. The momentum with which the Iron Curtain 
fell gave way to various new democratic states and brought with it hope and optimism to 
onlookers and participants alike. The European Union did its part by investing billions upon 
billions of euros into the region, earmarked for efforts which promoted democratization 
and liberal values with the ultimate goal of encouraging their accession to the European 
Union. The three most recent eastern expansions of the EU—Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (in addition to Cyprus and 
Malta) in 2004; Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; and Croatia in 2013—almost doubled the 
number of member states in the EU, from 15 to 28. The Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) region’s successes with these transitions to the European Union were thought to be 
proof that liberal democracy could be exported to countries with non-democratic legacies. 
 However, many scholars are beginning to fear that rather than being unique cases, 
the rise of self-described ‘illiberal’ politicians, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s 
Kaczyński, exemplify a rejection of liberal democracy in the region more broadly. This 
has brought forth an uncomfortable question about the role of the European Union: is 
the EU now at a point where it prescribes and enforces certain principles, institutions, and 
fundamental values? And how well, or how poorly, are post-socialist member states actu-
ally complying? This paper attempts to answer that question by looking at the European 
Union’s legal system, specifically through infringement case data. The Commission is the 
primary enforcer of EU law—so by comparing infringement data of post-socialist member 
states with Western European member states, we can observe any relative differences in 
compliance trends, both in general as well as in the most fundamental aspects of European 
law. 
 If the EU now prescribes a specific set of liberal democratic institutions and values, 
it certainly did not always do so. The European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 was the 
basis of a purely economic union with the goal of ensuring peace on a war-torn and indus-
trially destroyed continent. As Tim Marshall aptly puts it, “what is now the EU was set up 
so that France and Germany could hug each other so tightly… that neither would be able to 
get an arm free with which to punch the other” (Marshall, 2016, p. 5). Yet through its many 
iterations—from the initial treaty of Rome, to the Treaty of Maastricht and the creation of 
the Eurozone, to the most recent Treaty of Lisbon—the EU has become an unprecedented 
supranational governing body, in which member states maintain sovereignty in certain ar-
eas, and in others, have given it up. This has been met with resistance from member states, 
which claim that the newer treaties, which further encroach on areas under member state 
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sovereignty, are not what they signed up for. Orbán’s Hungary is a prime example of this— 
in 2017, Fidesz sent out surveys entitled, “Állítsuk meg Brüsszelt!” (Let’s Stop Brussels!), 
in which citizens were asked to give recommendations on how Hungary should deal with 
(and often simply ignore) EU policies, such as migrant quotas (Cerulus, 2017). This is not 
to say that euro-skeptic and anti-immigrant sentiments are exclusive to Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, what is troubling from a more foundational perspective is the increas-
ingly tenuous respect for the rule of law in these post-socialist member states, which seem 
to demonstrate a disrespect for liberal values more generally. 
 The purpose of this paper is to contribute a broader approach to understanding 
fundamental values compliance in the post-socialist member states, while dispelling certain 
false conceptions about the region. While it would be logical to presume that high overall 
compliance with EU law would translate into compliance with European values, especially 
regarding the rule of law, this paper finds that not to be the case. The pattern of post-socialist 
member state compliance with EU law, which demonstrate high overall compliance but 
low fundamental values compliance, permits the rise of more autocratic and less liberal poli-
tics without being checked by external mechanisms. In the cases where fundamental values 
are not being complied with, the EU institutions have virtually no enforcement power over 
nations which are not themselves committed to liberal democratic systems of government. 
Just as the old adage goes, ‘you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink,’ EU 
bureaucrats can set standards and institutional requirements, but cannot force civil society to 
expect and demand liberal democratic norms from their government. 
 This paper is divided into four sections. The first section surveys the existing lit-
erature on Eastern European democratization, EU legal compliance, and the enforcement 
of fundamental European values. The next section explains the research methodology used 
in the paper. The third section examines the data on general patterns of compliance, as well 
as the two subsets of EU law that are most intertwined with fundamental European values: 
‘Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship’ and ‘Home Affairs.’ The fourth and final sec-
tion will look at ongoing efforts on behalf of the EU to enforce fundamental rights in two 
countries which are failing to comply: Hungary and Poland. 
2. Literature Review The immediate post-Cold War era was filled with excitement for scholars who 
studied economic and political transitions. It quickly became clear that the next question 
was if and when these post-socialist states would join the EU, and if they had the institution-
al and societal capacities to make the necessary changes. Scholars have generally come to a 
consensus that potential and realized EU membership encourages a ‘convergence’ of values 
between potential and new member states with Western Europe. Some, like Olsen, ascribe 
this to the process of ‘Europeanization:' whereas ‘Europe’ used to signify a geographic loca-
tion, it now connotes a very specific set of political values, social norms, and institutions 
(Olsen, 2002).
 The notion that post-socialist member states’ democratization processes pose a 
challenge to the EU, however, is not unfounded. More and more commonly in studies of 
the region, scholars have observed a disconnect between institution building required in the 
accession process, which has been relatively successful during pre-accession years, and politi-
cal values, which have not formulated nearly as quickly (Krastev, 2018). This left institutions 
hollow, without the backbone of a civil society ready to protect democratic institutions 
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from the type of strong-man demagogic leaders currently in power in many post-socialist 
European member states. As James Dawson and Sean Hanley succinctly note, “accounts… 
of democratic consolidation and progress as a function of elite calculation rather than iden-
tification has always been in conflict with the equally taken-for-granted notion that ‘de-
mocracy needs democrats’ and the only slightly more contested idea that ‘democracy needs 
democratic citizens’” (Dawson & Hanley, 2016, p. 22). 
 A decent amount of scholarly work has been completed on the efficacy of EU le-
gal enforcement and patterns of compliance. For example, Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib 
find that Central and Eastern European member states fall into a pattern of compliance they 
categorize as ‘dead letters,’ where initial implementation of EU law is quick, but meaningful 
and continued implementation is lacking (Falkner & Treib, 2008). Another important as-
pect of compliance are the different areas of EU law with which states more or less comply. 
One theory is that states comply with EU laws which align with government interests at 
that time, and do not comply when government interests and EU law are at odds (König & 
Mäder, 2008). More recent literature even shows that the newest additions to the EU are 
often the most compliant, though this is mostly attributed to the theory that as the ‘condi-
tionality’ of EU accession wears off, member states are less incentivized to comply and their 
compliance worsens (Fjelstul & Carrubba, 2018). 
 However, while there are numerous works devoted to the analysis of the post-
socialist member states’ compliance, and even more work devoted to strategic theories of 
compliance, there is surprisingly little literature that directly compares regional compliance, 
such as the post-socialist member states with their EU-15 counterparts over time. As Dimitri 
Toshkov aptly notes, “The idea that CEE forms a separate cluster is also methodologically 
suspect because it is derived, like much of the literature on compliance in CEE, from com-
parisons between CEE countries only, while the reference group of the old member states 
is left out… In addition, most of the existing studies focus on the environmental and social 
policy fields, which although substantively important, account for only a small proportion 
of the EU legislation in force” (Toshkov, 2012, p. 20). Toshkov himself attempts a more 
comparative analysis, but only looks at three very specific areas of EU law: electronic com-
munications, consumer protection, and animal welfare—none of which exemplify or serve 
as a proxy for fundamental EU values. 
 The lack of compliance literature on specific areas of EU law becomes even more 
interesting when compared to the ‘rule of law’ literature, in which there is a growing aca-
demic consensus that post-socialist member states are exhibiting what Dimitry Kochenov 
terms ‘systemic defiance,’ described as “a type of violation of EU law which is especially 
grave, so that it affects the fundamental requirements of the EU” (Kochenov, 2017, p. 49). 
He argues that simply complying with EU law is not enough to prevent the violation of 
certain fundamental rights, as the ‘pluralism’ inherent in the European Union legally per-
mits departures from certain assumed EU principles. This paper aims to expound on and 
rationalize the seemingly-contradictory claims regarding CEE in the Europeanization, legal 
compliance, and fundamental values schools of literature, to form a more complete picture 
as to how the region currently functions within the European Union. 
3. Research Methodology
 Despite common presumptions about the region, how is post-socialist Europe as-
similating into the European Union and complying with its laws and fundamental values? 
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In this section, I will explain the research methodologies used to answer this question. First, 
the concepts of legal compliance and fundamental European rights are both explained and 
operationalized. While imperfect, infringement case data is the best data to assess compliance 
with European law. Next, I will explain the hypotheses tested in the body of the paper. 
These hypotheses come directly from the three schools of literature reviewed in the previ-
ous section and are outlined at the end of this section. 
3.1. Operationalizing Variables
 In order to begin to answer this research question, some concepts have to be de-
fined and operationalized. First, what is ‘compliance’ and how is it measured? For the pur-
poses of this paper, compliance is measured by infringement cases opened against a member 
state by the Commission. The first line of defense when member states violate European 
law is the Commission. The Commission has the power to open infringement proceedings 
against these states, and if a state continues to violate the law, the case is eventually referred 
to the European Court of Justice. These infringement cases can be opened for any violation 
of binding EU law, which is comprised of primary and secondary law. The former includes 
treaty law, which becomes national law upon the accession of the member state to the EU. 
The latter includes regulations (which apply directly), directives (which require the transpo-
sition of the EU law into national law through the national legislative process), and decisions 
(which apply directly to specific parties in a legal dispute). Opinions and recommendations 
also fall under the category of secondary law, but because they are not binding, they do not 
result in infringement proceedings and thus do not fall under the scope of this paper. The 
infringement case datasets used in this paper were generously provided by Joshua C. Fjelstul, 
a doctoral candidate in Political Science at Emory University (Fjelstul, 2016). The datasets 
contain over 16,000 infringement cases opened by the Commission from 2003-2016 and 
include all cases active at any point during this period. 
 Data on the actual compliance of member states with regards to European law is 
notoriously difficult to attain. As Miriam Hartlaap and Gerda Falkner note, there are three 
major types of data to draw on surrounding the theme of compliance: transposition noti-
fications from states, infringement cases by the Commission, and mass surveys (Hartlaap & 
Falkner, 2008, p. 6). Transposition notifications from states are helpful in that they are usu-
ally very timely—however, they cannot speak to the effectiveness of the law’s implementa-
tion, since they are self-reported by states. Infringement cases by the Commission address 
the question of efficacy but are problematic in that the Commission may not act every time 
a member state violates EU law. There is a lively and ongoing debate as to whether the 
Commission and Court of Justice are biased toward states they believe will comply with 
their decisions—when enforcement costs are perceived as low—and, conversely, if they 
decide not to act against states they believe may not—when enforcement costs are perceived 
as high (König & Mäder, 2013). Mass surveys are reflective of public opinion and thus useful 
in catching instances of perceived non-compliance, but similar to transposition notifications, 
cannot speak to actual effectiveness. Though infringement data certainly has its problems, 
Falkner and Hartlaap’s (2008) analysis justifies the use of this type of data if the research 
question centers around the effectiveness of legal implementation.
 Having established how overall compliance can be operationalized, what are fun-
damental European values and how can adherence to them specifically be measured? As 
mentioned previously, these fundamental values can be found in Article 2 of the Treaty 
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of the European Union (TEU), which states that the Union is meant to protect the values 
which “are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrim-
ination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” and 
include “values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights.” The European Parliament and Commission have different 
methods by which they can intervene to protect these values, but the first and most often 
used is the Commission’s initiation of infringement proceedings against the member state in 
question. 
 The two departments selected for the purposes of evaluating fundamental values 
compliance are ‘Home Affairs,’ which involves immigration, asylum, and border security 
policy, and ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship,’ which protects the values found 
in Article 2 of the TEU. These two departments or sectors of EU law deal most directly 
with the fundamental sovereignties of a nation-state—deciding who can stay, live, and 
become a citizen of a nation, and who cannot. As Florian Trauner further explains, “co-
operation in the justice and home affairs (JHA) domain has been a sensitive issue, bearing 
in mind that the control of state borders, civil liberties, residence and citizenship, and law 
and order are closely interlinked with the sovereignty of a nation state” (Trauner, 2011, p. 
145). These two sectors are key to research because they deal most directly with principles 
that are central to liberal democracies: the rule of law, the separation of state powers, plural-
ism, and the protection of civil, political, and human rights. They are also sectors in which 
there is limited comparative strategic benefit to complying—whereas there are quantifiable 
economic benefits to member states in having a single market and customs union, which 
arguably outweigh the advantages of maintaining total sovereignty over those sectors, there 
are no such incentives for compliance within JHA. Finally, as mentioned previously, these 
areas are of particular interest to study because they have received a large amount of media 
attention, and are areas in which post-socialist member states are presumed to be leading the 
charge against the liberal values of the European Union. 
 Arguably the most direct link between EU law and fundamental values specifically 
is the procedure outlined in Article 7 of the TEU, which has two parts: 7(1) a preventative 
mechanism which can be activated in the case of a “clear risk of a serious breach,” and 7(2) 
a sanctioning mechanism in the case of a “serious and persistent breach by a Member State” 
of the values within Article 2 of the TEU. The sanctioning mechanism can suspend certain 
rights of the member state in question, including their voting rights within the Council. As 
noted on the Union’s website, respect for the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection 
of European fundamental values and all other rights and obligations derived from the Eu-
ropean treaties. Article 7 procedures were created as a fail-safe, in the event that the rule of 
law was not being respected by a member state. However, this is effectively a last resort and 
has never been fully implemented to date, though there are ongoing Article 7(1) procedures 
against both Hungary and Poland.
4. Hypotheses and Tests
 As reviewed in the previous section, there are three distinct schools of thought 
about post-socialist member state compliance, which each lead to multiple hypotheses about 
post-socialist member state compliance. This paper will test all three of these schools of 
thought. The first two hypotheses come from the literature on Europeanization, which 
predicts that post-socialist member state compliance should, firstly, become more and more 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/7
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 8 3
similar to the compliance patterns of the EU-15, and secondly, comply just as well with 
fundamental European values specifically as the older member states as assimilation occurs. 
To test these hypotheses, I first examine patterns of general compliance by comparing the 
average number of infringement cases open against post-socialist member states within three 
different time periods, with the average number of infringement cases open during the same 
time period against the EU-15 countries. Averages are taken from three separate time pe-
riods, 2004-2007, 2008-2012, and 2013-2016, for two reasons: a) to correctly account for 
the additions of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia in 2013; and b) to see if and 
how comparative compliance has changed over time. As mentioned previously, to observe 
comparative compliance with fundamental European values, this paper looks at two subsets 
of EU law—‘Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’ and ‘Home Affairs’—and com-
pares average compliance over time with the EU-15. 
 The third and fourth hypotheses come from the compliance literature, which pre-
dicts that as time goes on and as the conditionality of EU membership becomes obsolete, 
post-socialist member states’ compliance will worsen. This will be tested in the same man-
ner as stated above, looking comparatively over three time periods at averages of general 
compliance data. However, this school of literature does not provide theories of compliance 
that are specific to fundamental values, either explicitly or implicitly. This is where the rule 
of law literature comes in, which strongly asserts that fundamental values are under attack 
in post-socialist member states. Thus, the fifth hypothesis is that post-socialist member states 
are complying poorly with fundamental European values, as compared with the EU-15. 
The sixth hypothesis is that compliance in this area is getting worse over time. These will 
be tested through the same method as mentioned before, looking comparatively and over 
time at compliance within the Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship sector, as well 
as within the Home Affairs sector (known together as JHA). 
5. Confirming and Challenging the Narratives
 This section examines the infringement case data and analyzes the patterns of com-
pliance shown for post-socialist member states. First, I look at trends in overall compliance, 
comparing post-socialist compliance with that of the EU-15. The most prominent pattern 
of compliance is in fact not an East-West divide, but rather a North-South divide. Next, 
two specific sectors of EU law are examined to analyze fundamental values compliance: 
‘Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship’ and ‘Home Affairs.’ While post-socialist 
member states are clearly backsliding in ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’ com-
pliance, they perform equally as well, or poorly, as the EU-15 with respect to Home Affairs. 
Overall, the data paints a very different picture from the popular conception of post-socialist 
member states as the problem-states for the European Union. Because the PIGS nations 
(Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) are consistently the worse compliers in every respect, it 
is important to keep in mind that post-socialist member states may be a new problem for the 
Commission, but are not the largest problem in terms of absolute infringement procedures. 
5.1. General Compliance Patterns
 How do post-socialist member states comply with EU law compared to the EU-
15? Table 1 below summarizes the overall patterns of compliance in three time periods: 
2004-2007, 2008-2012, and 2013-2016. In all three time periods, post-socialist member 
state compliance is varied, meaning that the group of countries do not all comply well, nor 
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do they all comply poorly. However, one thing that is clear from this data is that in each 
time interval, there are more post-socialist member states in the top half of compliers than 
in the bottom half. Moreover, there are as many (from 2013-2016) or more (from 2008-
2012) post-socialist member states whose compliance improves than there are post-socialist 
member states whose compliance worsens.  
Table 1. General Compliance Data (Fjelstul, 2016)
Table created by author. States are listed in columns divided by years from least number of infringement cases 
during that time period to greatest. Post-socialist member states are underlined; states whose compliance improves 
relative to the rest of the EU are in bold; states whose compliance worsens relative to the rest of the EU are in 
italics; states whose compliance either stayed the same, or who acceded to the EU during that time period, are left 
unmarked. Dataset created by Joshua C. Fjelstul.
 
An initial survey of the data requires a few notes and explanations. Firstly, this paper is 
less interested in the absolute compliance of post-socialist member states than it is interested 
in the relative compliance and comparisons. This is why for the rest of this section, the 
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data selected are averages of compliance. However, it is interesting to note that overall, the 
number of infringement cases seems to be decreasing, especially over the time period from 
2013-2016. This could mean one of two things: either compliance is actually improving in 
the European Union as a whole, or the Commission is doing a worse job at monitoring and 
enforcing compliance through the initiation of infringement cases. The latter is the subject 
of a lively and ongoing debate within the field. While Clifford Carrubba and Joshua Fjelstul 
notably find the Commission to be an effective if imperfect monitor and enforcer of law, 
they acknowledge the Commission and the Court do strategically drop cases they feel they 
are unlikely to win (Fjelstul & Carrubba 2018). Thomas König and Lars Mäder further 
identify a compliance deficit which results from this selective enforcement, when the EU 
monitoring branches refrain from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is 
low and the sanctioning costs are high (König & Mäder 2013). The strategic nature of the 
Commission and the Court will be revisited in the final section of this paper as it may relate 
to the ongoing Article 7 procedures in Hungary and Poland. 
 Having better understood the context in which this paper uses infringement data, 
we can observe from the averages in Table 2 (see below) how post-socialist member states 
are complying in comparison to the EU-15. Since 2004, and throughout all three selected 
time periods, post-socialist member states infringe less upon EU law than the EU-15, where 
the Baltic states and Scandinavia are among the best compliers, the PIGS nations (Portugal, 
Italy, Greece, and Spain) are among the worst, and Central European states remain mixed 
in the middle. Contrary to what the compliance literature on the effects of conditionality 
would predict, compliance has not worsened since the accession of these member states to 
the EU. In fact, the data shows the opposite: the disparity between the EU-15 and CEE 
member states is increasing as time goes on, meaning that the CEE member states are 
complying better and better than the EU-15. The data does not support Hypothesis 3, that 
compliance worsens as conditionality effects wear off, suggesting that the literature on con-
ditionality as it relates to overall legal compliance in the EU is outdated and inaccurate.  
Table 2. General Compliance Averages
Averages are calculated by taking the total number of infringement cases open against the particular group of 
countries during the specified time period and dividing it by the number of countries in the group. Table created by 
author. Dataset created by Joshua C. Fjelstul.
 This is not to say that the multiple works by Gerda Falkner in the CEE region, 
which highlight a pattern of quick transposition of EU directives into national law followed 
by a lack of meaningful implementation (the so-called “dead letters” pattern), are incorrect 
(Falkner and Treib 2008). However, this data does show that there is either a significant lack 
of monitoring and fixing the “dead letters” pattern, or this pattern is non-unique to post-
socialist Europe.
 In fact, there is more evidence to suggest the latter. The data averages show very 
little evidence of an East-West divide within overall EU legal compliance. However, the 
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data do show a more surprising pattern. Compliance correlates very strongly with what can 
be loosely termed the North-South divide, where the financially-solvent states, such as the 
Netherlands and Germany, have higher compliance than debtor nations like Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal. There are numerous arguments about why this North-South divide persists, 
and if and how it is deepening. Michael Landesmann’s explanation focuses on economic 
factors, including rising debt in the private sector and a lack of diversification in commod-
ity exports (Landesmann, 2015). Garret Martin notes that many believe the divide is also, 
or even predominantly, a cultural one, though he also adds that many of these perceptions 
are factually dubious. For example, according to OECD data on labor markets from 2012, 
Southern Europeans tended to work more hours than their Northern counterparts —2032 
hours on average per year for Greece, 1774 for Italy, and only 1413 for Germany. Retire-
ment ages between North and South were also comparable, and most surprisingly, North-
ern Europeans received more government assistance per capita than Southern Europeans 
(Martin, 2012). The reasons behind this divide are hotly contested and are not perfectly 
understood. What is important for the purposes of this paper, however, is twofold: that 
popular conceptions surrounding cultural and economic divides in Europe should not be 
taken at face value, and that post-socialist member states are clearly assimilating into the 
North-South pattern of compliance, as seen below in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The North-South Divide
Image taken from The Economist video: “Is it time to scrap ‘Eastern Europe’?” 
Financially solvent states are marked in light grey. Debtor nations are marked in dark grey. 
(retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ya55Q-WdIrQ)
Table 3. General Compliance Rankings 2013-2016
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Table created by author. Post-socialist states are underlined. Financially-solvent states are in bold, and debtor 
states are in italics. Member states which are not listed in the corresponding image above are omitted. Rankings 
are calculated by taking the total number of infringement cases open from 2013-2016. Dataset created by Joshua 
C. Fjelstul.
What non-economic or cultural factors could explain this correlation? One possible 
explanation is that financial solvency and effective administrative capacity could be inter-
twined, which, as Thomas König and Brooke Luetgert find, leads to higher compliance. 
They explain that administrative capacity is of central importance in legal compliance, and 
governments with higher administrative capacities tend to have higher compliance (König 
& Luetgert, 2008).
 The response to this, however, is that “effective administrative capacity” in the 
context of implementing EU laws can also include corrupt regimes, many of which are not 
financially solvent. The most prominent examples of this are Romania and Bulgaria, who 
almost certainly did not meet the requirements for accession when they joined the EU in 
2007 because of the prevalence of corruption. As Venelin Ganev convincingly argues, not 
only were Bulgaria and Romania clearly too corrupt for European Union standards before 
acceding to the European Union, but their successful accession actually increased corruption 
in those nations, by releasing them from the oversight placed on candidate member states, 
and then delivering structural funds directly to the hands of the powerful and corrupt net-
works of politicians (Ganev, 2012). The same could be said of Hungary currently, where 
Fidesz holds a supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament, while corruption flourishes.
 Regarding EU legal compliance, it follows from this line of reasoning that corrupt 
politicians can get EU bureaucrats off their back by virtue of being able to easily pass laws. 
This is yet another interpretation of the ‘dead letters’ pattern observed by Falkner and Treib 
and would indicate that the experience of post-socialist member states since the time of their 
accession to the EU has centered around creating the appearance of a certain institutional 
and political structures, simply going through the motions of transposing EU directives into 
law without meaningful implementation of the laws themselves. This gives a sufficient il-
lusion of commitment to the European values to placate European bureaucrats, while still 
allowing illiberal and corrupt politicians to further their own agendas as their networks and 
system of support are consolidated. 
 Yet neither the ‘dead letters’ perspective from Falkner and Treib nor Ganev’s 
description of corruption through EU structural fund transfers can explain the exception of 
the Baltic states (for the purposes of this paper, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Despite their 
short-lived EU membership and their soviet legacy, the Baltic states are star compliers and 
fall into neither the ‘dead letters’ nor high corruption categories (Wadsworth, Swartz, & 
Wheat, 2010). In fact, not only do these three countries actively try to distance themselves 
from the rest of post-socialist Europe, but politicians from these countries have echoed their 
citizens’ anger and dismay at being called such. Recently, when the British daily newspaper 
The Guardian launched its “New East Network” to cover news in the “15 countries that 
rose from the ashes of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics),” representatives 
from all three nations responded with similar indignation (Pyzik, 2014, p. 1). The Lithu-
anian ambassador, Asta Skaisgiryté Liauškiené, said that nowadays Lithuania has shed any 
traces of Soviet history and is a “vibrant civic society” committed to “western values,” while 
Latvian ambassador Andris Teikmanis called the project “switching [the] time machine back 
to USSR.” Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the president of Estonia, declared: “[w]e are no more 
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‘new’ than Finland, Austria, et al, all post WWI (World War I) states,” and labeled the 
newspaper’s concept as “intellectually bankrupt” (Pyzik, 2014, p.1). Thus, we can neither 
support the administrative capacity argument, nor that of a widespread pattern of 'dead let-
ters' and/or corruption within the region as a whole.
 While it is not clear exactly why this correlation between financial solvency and 
European legal compliance persists, what this data does establish is that post-socialist mem-
ber states are assimilating into compliance patterns that already exist within Europe along a 
North-South divide. In fact, this is perhaps better explained in terms of regional divides, as 
seen below in Table 4, where compliance averages are divided into regional groups. This 
supports Hypothesis 1, that post-socialist member state compliance overall would become 
more and more similar to that of Western Europe. The Baltic states have extremely high 
compliance, as does Scandinavia, while states such as Romania or Hungary have lower 
compliance and perform more similarly to southern European countries like France. How-
ever, the findings on general compliance patterns do not support Hypothesis 3, that compli-
ance will decrease in CEE countries as conditionality wears off. In fact, the opposite trend 
is observed here—CEE countries are complying, overall, better and better with EU law. 
Table 4. Regional Averages for General Compliance
Table created by author. Post-socialist member states are in bold. Data from the Balkans in 2004-2007 are not 
used since Romania and Bulgaria acceded to the EU in 2007. The total number of infringement cases are taken 
from all countries in the specified category during the specified time period and are then divided by the number of 
countries in that group. Dataset compiled by Joshua C. Fjelstul.
5.2. Fundamental Values Compliance
 Do post-socialist member states comply less with fundamental European values? 
The infringement data on the sectors of “Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship” 
and “Home Affairs,” taken from a complete data set of infringement cases from 2004-2016, 
seem to cautiously support this conception. Looking at these two departments sheds light on 
the popular narratives. To begin, we first examine the data on Justice, Fundamental Rights, 
and Citizenship infringements. From 2004-2007, the CEE countries comply better than the 
EU-15. This is similar in 2008-2012, though their compliance is decreasing, but from 2013-
2016, the CEE countries are worse compliers than their EU-15 counterparts. This shows 
that post-socialist member states are, in fact, now complying less with fundamental EU val-
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ues than their EU-15 counterparts. More importantly, as the EU-15 compliance within this 
sector is improving, post-socialist member state compliance is worsening. This data would seem 
to support both Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 from the rule of law literature: that post-
socialist member state compliance with fundamental values is at the moment significantly 
worse than that of Western Europe, and that their compliance in this sector is deteriorating 
over time.
Table 5. Compliance Data on Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship
Averages are calculated by taking the total number of infringement cases in the department of ‘Justice, Fundamental 
Rights, and Citizenship’ open against the particular group of countries during the specified time period and divid-
ing it by the number of countries in the group. Table created by author. Dataset created by Joshua C. Fjelstul
 This is an important finding because it also demonstrates the limited effects of con-
ditional requirements. If the values-based requirements for accession to the EU did indeed 
incentivize initial compliance in post-socialist member states, that effect has now worn off, 
supporting Hypothesis 4, that as conditionality wears off, fundamental rights compliance 
decreases. Eli Gateva explains this in the context of Romania and Bulgaria, the most recent 
accessions except for Croatia in 2013. The Commission created a specific Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania during their accession process, 
meant to deal with the two most pressing issues precluding their accession: corruption in 
both states, and organized crime in Bulgaria (Gateva, 2013). The monitoring mechanism 
lasted even after the accession of these states. Gateva argues that even this mechanism is 
ineffective given the “limited penalizing power of the remedial and preventative sanctions 
established in the framework of the CVM,” and, as a result, there is a “very weak negative 
incentive structure” (Gateva, 2013, p. 7). The data here leads to a similar conclusion: there 
is little incentive for CEE countries to continue complying with the aspects of EU law that 
they do not wish to comply with (such as Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship or 
JFRC) when there is a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms after accession. 
 Examining the data on a regional level gives even more insight into compliance 
patterns. Table 6 shows that compliance with Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
do not fall as strongly into a regional pattern of compliance, meaning that geography does 
not explain JFRC compliance as strongly as it did with overall compliance in the previous 
section. Instead, we see CEE countries complying worse as conditionality wears off. There 
is, however, one key exception: the Baltic States remain star compliers and do not seem to 
fall into this pattern, giving credence to the ‘Baltic exception’ discussed in the previous sec-
tion.
A Moral Bureaucracy
9 0 Sarah L. Sheets University of California, Berkeley
Table 6. Regional Averages for JFRC Compliance
Table created by author. Post-socialist member states are in bold. Data from the Balkans in 2004-2007 are not 
used since Romania and Bulgaria acceded to the EU in 2007. The total number of infringement cases in the 
department of ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’ are taken from all countries in the specified category 
during the specified time period and are then divided by the number of countries in that group. Dataset compiled 
by Joshua C. Fjelstul.
Home Affairs, however, which encompasses immigration and asylum policy at the 
European level, is an altogether different story. From 2004-2007, CEE countries performed 
slightly worse than, but still very similar to, the EU-15 in this department. From 2008-
2012, the CEE region’s compliance is slightly better than the EU-15; and in 2013-2016, 
their average is again slightly worse, but almost equal with that of the EU-15 (and still lower 
than the overall EU average). While there is a popular conception that the East is more 
xenophobic and less compliant with asylum quotas and immigration requirements, this data 
paints a different picture, one in which European bureaucrats have turned the East into a 
scapegoat for a much more widespread problem. It seems hypocritical for EU bureaucrats 
to condemn the region as threatening the unity of the Union, as they have done on many 
occasions, while the EU-15 states themselves perform virtually no better in the Home Af-
fairs department. 
Table 7. Compliance Data on Home Affairs
Averages are calculated by taking the total number of infringement cases in the department of ‘Justice, Fundamental 
Rights, and Citizenship’ open against the particular group of countries during the specified time period and divid-
ing it by the number of countries in the group. Table created by author. Dataset created by Joshua C. Fjelstul
 
This is a key example of what Galland and Lemel found previously—that conflating 
Europeanization with ‘modernization’ or ‘liberalization’ is a misguiding practice (Galland 
& Lemel, 2008). While we would expect from media headlines such as “EU Takes Action 
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Against Eastern States for Refusing to Take Refugees” to see the region as a whole com-
plying much worse in the Home Affairs sector, this turns out not to be the case. This is 
seen even more clearly when the data is separated regionally, as seen below in Table 8. The 
unfortunate truth is that anti-immigration and anti-asylum sentiments are widespread, and 
evidently evenly spread, throughout Europe.
Table 8. Regional Averages for Home Affairs Compliance
Table created by author. Post-socialist member states are in bold. Data from the Balkans in 2004-2007 are not 
used since Romania and Bulgaria acceded to the EU in 2007. The total number of infringement cases in the 
department of ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’ are taken from all countries in the specified category 
during the specified time period and are then divided by the number of countries in that group. Dataset compiled 
by Joshua C. Fjelstul.
6. Summary
 To summarize, the data on the general compliance patterns of post-socialist mem-
ber states supports Hypothesis 1 and finds that post-socialist European member states are 
assimilating into the pre-existing western European patterns of compliance. However, they 
are doing this in two unexpected ways. Firstly, the conditional requirement for accession 
do not seem to have influenced the general compliance of post-socialist states, since they 
are complying better and better as time goes on, the opposite of what the literature on 
conditionality would expect. Secondly, compliance patterns seem to correlate with financial 
solvency, where economically-solvent member states have higher compliance than member 
states with large amounts of debt. Overall compliance patterns are also seen on a regional 
level, where Scandinavia and the Baltic states comply similarly, as do the Central European 
states, post-socialist and non-post-socialist alike.
 With regards to fundamental values compliance, the data shows that post-socialist 
member states are complying comparatively, and increasingly, worse with Justice, Funda-
mental Rights, and Citizenship. This supports both Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 from the 
rule of law literature. However, when examining the data on ‘Home Affairs,’ it becomes 
clear that CEE member states are complying equally as well (or poorly) as Western Europe. 
This challenges the popular sentiment that the threats to ‘liberal European values,’ which 
include the free movement of people, come predominantly from the East. If European 
Union officials want to enforce refugee quotas and immigration policies in post-socialist 
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Europe without coming off as hypocritical, they will need to enforce those values in their 
own nations as well.
 Overall, all three theories have some important explanatory power, but lack the 
nuance to fully explain post-socialist member state compliance in the EU. The European-
ization school of thought explains very well the patterns of overall post-socialist member 
state compliance, as well as their compliance within the department of Home Affairs, but 
cannot account for the worsening ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’ compli-
ance in the region. The rule of law literature accurately notes an apparent backslide in post-
socialist member state compliance with laws pertaining to the ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights 
and Citizenship’ department, but cannot explain the notable exception of the Baltic States. 
The compliance literature accurately warned that as conditionality wore off, the afore-
mentioned backslide might take place—yet conditionality has not taken effect in overall 
compliance. 
 It is important to take these findings in context with one another. Looking only 
at overall compliance data hides the fact that post-socialist states are less compliant with 
fundamental European values, something that the EU may decide to more rigorously and 
proactively enforce. However, in the area of immigration and asylum policy, it seems that 
the East has become a scapegoat to help western European policymakers ignore the uncom-
fortable reality that anti-immigration sentiments are a European problem, not just an Eastern 
European problem. Above all, this data showcases that simply enforcing EU law through the 
Commission, and resulting high overall compliance, is insufficient to ensure that fundamen-
tal values are protected. It follows from this that European leaders must soon decide both if 
they will continue to enforce these values, and how they will do so. 
Table 9. Hypotheses and Resulting Data Summarized
Table created by author. Dataset created by Joshua C. Fjelstul.
7. Article 7: Hungary and Poland
7.1. Background
 When the Commission’s infringement procedures are not enough to ensure com-
pliance, what other avenues are available to the EU to enforce fundamental liberal, dem-
ocratic values? A paper concerning fundamental European values would be incomplete 
without an analysis of Article 7. While part of the Lisbon treaty, the basis for Article 7 was 
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created in the late nineties to prevent consistent treaty violations after post-socialist member 
states had successfully acceded to the Union and the incentives of conditionality wore off. 
Though the Commission is the most common enforcer of EU law, Article 7 allows the EU 
to potentially strip a member state of its voting rights within the Union’s various institu-
tions if it is determined to have a “significant and persistent breach of the European values 
referred to in Article 2.” 
 There is virtually no precedent for the use of Article 7. One of the key events 
which led to its development in the Nice and Lisbon treaties took place in Austria. In 1999, 
after decades of rule by a coalition of social and Christian democrats, Austrian voters chose 
the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). The Freedom Party in many ways resembled the far-
right parties seen in Europe today; it is compared to Jobbik, Hungary’s far-right party, and 
the leader of the Freedom Party, Jörg Haider, has praised the Waffen SS on record. The 
EU’s response to the election was a ‘diplomatic isolation’ of Austria, which had neither 
teeth nor tactical effect. The weak display of ‘diplomacy’ was a bust, in which politicians 
did nothing except to refuse to take pictures or shake hands with Austrian officials. This 
backfired and served instead to fuel Euroscepticism in Austria, as citizens felt they were be-
ing treated unfairly, given that Haider’s party was elected freely and fairly (Leconte, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the so-called ‘Haider affair’ informed the creation of Article 7 in the Nice 
and Lisbon treaties and ultimately provided the EU with a legal option than hadn’t existed 
previously to deal with the rise of illiberal parties within the European Union. 
 Cécile Leconte believes that the Haider affair set a dangerous precedent for fu-
ture far-right parties: “EU leaders...were unwilling to uphold the principles initially evoked 
against the FPÖ. As a consequence of this dilemma, the threshold of political acceptability 
inside the EU has been lowered; every coalition partner now seems acceptable as long as 
it does not commit concrete violations of human rights. The EU is now less likely to take 
steps against national governments or leaders that might openly contest its fundamental 
values” (Leconte, 2005, p. 7). Leconte was probably right. While countries like the Czech 
Republic and Hungary were the poster-children for democratic erosion and the rise of il-
liberalism in the EU, there is much literature to suggest that democratic consolidation was 
more of a façade in the region than a meaningful change. Dawson and Hanley observe that 
the ‘liberalism’ of the transitions in the region was “an elite project driven by small groups 
at the apex of politics, business, academia, and officialdom,” arguing that this “narrow 
economic, technocratic variant of liberalism merged with existing illiberal narratives and 
interests which pro-European elites generally opted to accommodate rather than oppose” 
(Dawson & Hanley, 2016, p. 21). They further find that sham institutions in the region were 
masking “an absence of genuinely liberal political platforms—by which we mean a range of 
mainstream ideologies of both the left and right based on shared commitments to the norms 
of political equality, individual liberty, civic tolerance, and the rule of law.” Unfortunately, 
Article 7 procedures may indeed be too little, too late in the face of systemically underde-
veloped democracies throughout the region with a precedent of tolerance at the European 
level for democratic façades.
7.2. Case Comparison: Hungary and Poland
 There are ongoing Article 7 proceedings against two countries at the moment: 
Hungary and Poland. It is impossible to fully understand the current case of Poland without 
first going through the story of Hungary. These are generally similar cases—both coun-
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tries have political parties in power who openly support ‘democratic illiberalism,’ and both 
countries are examples of democratic erosion in the face of relatively successful economic 
stories (Dawson & Hanley, 2016). However, while these two country cases are consistently 
lumped together, their differences are key in understanding the predicament the EU is cur-
rently in. Moreover, their stories together have culminated in one of the greatest challenges 
to the EU’s enforcement of fundamental values within the Union. 
 Fidesz’s history is an interesting one. Starting as a radical liberal democratic party 
in Hungary in the early nineties, it was a partner in the governing center-right coalition 
from 1998-2002, and then remaining in the opposition until its outright victory in the 
landslide elections in 2010. By 2010, it had established itself under Viktor Orbán as a right-
wing political party and has continually drifted further right whilst continuing to secure a 
parliamentary super-majority of at least two-thirds at every election since. This has allowed 
Fidesz to make cardinal laws, or constitutional amendments, which favor Fidesz with elec-
toral redistricting, help Fidesz pack the courts with sympathetic judges, and make it much 
easier for the government to censor free press (Kornai, 2015). The story in Poland is shorter 
and more straightforward. In 2015, the far-right Law and Justice Party (PiS) won a landslide 
electoral victory—though critically, not a super-majority (as in the case of Hungary). PiS is 
led by Jarosław Kaczyński, who, while being just a member of parliament, clearly holds the 
strings behind the scenes (Dawson & Hanley, 2016). 
 The most obvious question, then, is why the EU didn’t use more of its regulatory 
powers to reign in Hungarian illiberalism before now, if there were clear violations of the 
fundamental principles enshrined in Article 2, especially given that the EU has taken a much 
stronger approach against Poland (and much more quickly). Daniel Keleman offers another 
explanation based on partisan politics at the EU level. Because Fidesz is part of the Euro-
pean People’s Party (EPP), which is still the largest party in the European Parliament, the 
parliament was reluctant to invoke systematic procedures such as the Venice Commission 
or Rule of Law Framework, not to mention Article 7 procedures, against a fellow member 
of their party (Keleman, 2017). However, as PiS is a member of the much smaller, euros-
ceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the EPP would have no party line 
to adhere to—they therefore had no problems overruling the ECR and invoking the Rule 
of Law Framework in Poland. Secondly, while Kaczyński has stated his desire to emulate 
what Fidesz has done in Hungary, there are a couple of distinct differences. PiS, a rather 
ideological party, does not hold a super-majority; as such, it has not been able to maneuver 
around EU law as adeptly as the more pragmatic Fidesz has. When PiS passed a law which 
effectively ousted judges with the intention of filling their places with PiS sympathizers, they 
did not have the two-thirds majority that their constitution requires for this kind of law. As 
a result, the EU has stepped in quickly and powerfully, initiating the Venice Commission 
to investigate the state of the independent judiciary. The unfortunate truth is that Fidesz’s 
actions in Hungary have, in a strictly legal sense, been formally allowed within the EU legal 
framework (Kornai, 2015). 
 This gets at the heart of the problem—the EU is based on the assumptions of com-
mon legal principles between all member states, as listed in Article 2 of the TEU, but lacks 
the practical ability to enforce these expectations. As stated previously, Kochenov notes 
that Article 2 of the TEU describes a set of fundamental principles, or ‘rules of the game,’ 
that all EU member states supposedly share (Kochenov, 2017, p. 51). Thus, the EU legal 
framework is predicated on member states already having institutions that uphold these 
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fundamental principles. However, as has become clear in the Hungarian case, these values 
that are supposedly “common to the Member States” are a) clearly not, and b) not truly 
protected by any procedure other than the so-called ‘nuclear option’ of Article 7. Zoltán 
Szente observes that “the very abstract nature of these [fundamental] values have repeatedly 
created difficulties for the EU institutions as to how to prove that particular national policy 
measures violate them” even though “in the Hungarian cases in question … the measures 
and polices as a whole are contrary to the basic values of the founding treaties” (Szente, 
2017, p. 352). Fidesz lawyers have argued that the EU principles of the preservation of 
“pluralism” and respect for different national legal systems protect Fidesz’s actions, especially 
regarding constitutional changes via cardinal law. Zoltán Szente responds that while “the 
TEU acknowledges the Member States’ right to establish and determine their own constitu-
tional structures, (…) the fundamental principle of the EU to respect national identities and 
the different legal systems (…) does not justify the violation of principles of the Rule of Law 
and democratic values by the Member States” (Szente, 2017, p. 354). Yet unfortunately, 
this academic theorizing has not permeated the practical application of EU law, and Article 
7 remains a divisive and, at this point, futile option. Because Fidesz and PiS have agreed to 
protect one another from EU punishments, and because a full triggering of the sanctioning 
process requires unanimity among the European Council, neither Poland nor Hungary will 
have their voting rights revoked as laid out in Article 7(2).
8. Conclusion
 The purpose of this paper was to contribute to a more comparative and broader 
understanding of how post-socialist European member states are, or are not, assimilating 
into the EU, while dispelling false conceptions about the region. In part due to the fact that 
the question of how post-socialist member states are complying with EU law is a timely one, 
very little data-driven literature exists which explicitly compares the region’s compliance 
patterns with other European member states. Moreover, the existing theoretical literature 
on the region and its assimilation to the EU seems to draw contradictory conclusions. This 
paper builds upon this gap in the literature and uses infringement case data to compare post-
socialist member state compliance to the rest of the EU, looking at overall compliance, as 
well as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The findings confirm important hypotheses from 
all three schools of literature. Firstly, general compliance seems to be increasingly similar to 
EU-15 patterns when looking through the lens of a North-South, rather than East-West, 
divide (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, compliance with ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citi-
zenship’ is significantly worse in post-socialist member states than in the EU-15 and is cur-
rently deteriorating further (Hypotheses 6 and 7). 
 However, and perhaps more importantly, some findings directly contradict both 
existing literature on the subject as well as popular opinion. For example, while Justice, 
Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship compliance shows a significant backslide as noted in 
the rule of law literature, in Home Affairs, post-socialist member states comply just as well, 
or poorly, as Western Europe. This would seem to support the Europeanizationist perspec-
tive (Hypothesis 2), but contradict the rule of law literature. Moreover, while conditionality 
has not affected overall post-socialist compliance, which is still better than that of the EU-15 
(Hypothesis 4), conditionality seems to have played an extremely important role in ensuring 
fundamental rights compliance, because as time has passed, post-socialist compliance with 
fundamental rights has been worsening (Hypothesis 5). One of the largest takeaways from 
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this section is that simply complying with European law, even complying with it relatively 
well, is not enough to ensure that member states will adhere to the European fundamental 
values enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU. This begs the question of, and necessitates further 
research into, how biased and ineffective the Commission and the European Court of Jus-
tice are at correctly identifying and punishing violations of the values within Article 2. 
 Finally, this paper examined more closely how the current mechanisms of funda-
mental values enforcement have failed in the cases of Poland and Hungary. The EU has no 
historical precedent for ensuring that member states adhere to fundamental values, such as 
the rule of law or pluralist democracies, upon which the European Union was founded, and 
which all candidate countries are supposed to have already internalized. The current legal 
framework, which places most of the burden on the Commission and the Court to enforce 
these laws, is not enough to ensure that autocratic and illiberal leaders stay out of power. 
Moreover, the last resort of Article 7 is rendered useless in the cases of Hungary and Poland 
in its current state. Significant reforms will be needed if the EU is adamant about maintain-
ing its role as a supranational government which enforces a specific set of political and legal 
values—because currently, there seems to be little way to enforce them.
 The addition of so many transitioning democracies to the European Union has 
proved to be one of its most critical tests. There is a clear recent and regional pushback 
against fundamental EU values in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary and Poland are 
popular examples of what appears to be an underlying trend in the region, where demo-
cratic consolidation was much less successful than scholars previously believed, and where 
the rule of law is further deteriorating. However, it would be inaccurate to omit the push-
back and tensions within the EU framework as a whole—for example, with asylum and 
immigration quotas. The EU’s political project, starting as a purely economic organization 
and progressing to the hyper-bureaucratic, less-than-democratic supranational organization 
that it is today, is not just threatened by the newest additions, but also by some of the oldest. 
Unfortunately for the EU, it currently lacks the capacity to truly enforce the values it was 
supposedly founded upon. How the EU institutions and leaders decide to deal with the on-
going Article 7 procedures in Hungary and Poland will set an important precedent for how 
misbehaving member states will be treated in the future. Finding a balance between enforc-
ing the rule of law, while still preserving the values of democracy and pluralism within the 
Union, will be vital for any legitimate and unified solution.
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